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Abstract
Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this
paper, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed behaviour to be consistent
with a mixture model of single-peaked preferences for a given ordering of the alternatives.
These conditions can be tested in time polynomial in the number of choice alternatives. In
addition, algorithms are provided which identify the underlying ordering of choice alterna-
tives if ordering is unknown. These algorithms also run in polynomial time, providing an
efficient test for the mixture model of single-peaked preferences.
1 Introduction
Preferences play an important role in many areas of research. When faced with different alter-
natives, be it different cars, candidates in an election, budgets, etc., it is commonly assumed
that people have a preference ordering over all of these alternatives, ranking them from best
to worst. Often the nature of the alternatives restricts the possible preferences in some sense.
An important such restriction is given by single-peakedness, introduced by Black [3]. Suppose
a linear ordering exists, which ranks all alternatives along a line. An agent’s preferences are
then single-peaked if he has a most preferred alternative, the peak, and when comparing two
alternatives that are both on the same side of the peak, the alternative closest to the peak is
preferred. This restriction is very natural when considering a situation where a single attribute
of the alternatives drives the choice, for example, an election where candidates range from left
to right wing or choices over budgets of various sizes. Given these examples, it is no wonder that
this restriction has gained central importance in the areas of political science and social choice.
Apart from being an appealing model in these areas, the assumption of single-peaked preferences
has led to interesting theoretical results. For example, aggregation of single-peaked preferences
avoids the Condorcet-paradox.
Given the importance of single-peaked preferences, it is of interest to test if and in which sit-
uations agents hold such preferences. Given the complete preference profile of agents Bartholdi
and Trick [2] provide a polynomial time algorithm to test whether these are single-peaked in
regards to some ordering of the alternatives and to identify this ordering. Escoffier et al. [5]
provide a different algorithm for the same problem with a better worst-case bound. Ballester
and Haeringer [1] give two forbidden substructures, whose absence is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the given preference profile to be consistent with single-peakedness. Furthermore,
Trick [11] provides an algorithm for recognizing single-peakedness on trees, which again runs
in polynomial time. Finally, Knoblauch [7] investigates a closely related preference restriction,
one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles, and also provides a polynomial time algorithm.
In this paper, our goal is also to provide the means to test whether reported preferences
are consistent with single-peaked preferences, but instead of using the full preference profile of
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the agents, we will be working with aggregated preference data. For each pair of alternatives,
the proportion of the population preferring one over the other is known, but there is no further
information on the individual agents. The main question is then whether it is possible that a
population of agents holding single-peaked preferences have these aggregated preferences. Our
motivation for using this type of data is twofold. First, this setting is mathematically equivalent
to one often used in choice behaviour research. In this field, it is often observed that people make
inconsistent choices. When faced with repetitions of the same binary choice, choice reversals are
commonplace, even within short timeframes. One possible explanation is that while at any given
point in time, persons have consistent preferences, these preferences may change often. It is thus
hypothesized that a person has a set of preferences, and a probability distribution over them,
which gives the probability that he makes a decision based on a particular preference. Within
this literature, this is known as a mixture model [9]. In the case of general linear preferences,
testing this mixture model corresponds to testing whether the observed data lies within the lin-
ear ordering polytope [10]. Necessary and sufficient conditions, testable in polynomial time, are
given for a mixture model of heuristic choice behaviour by Davis-Stober [4]. We wish to provide
a test of the mixture model when the preferences are restricted to single-peaked preferences.
Second, when returning to a social choice setting, the advantage of this mixture model setting is
that aggregated choice data is easier to obtain than full preference profiles. Furthermore, it may
not even be the case that a fixed preference order for agents is a reliable representation of the
agent’s preferences. One drawback of the mixture model is that it is less restrictive than tests on
full preference profiles, since it is possible that the aggregated preference of a non-single-peaked
population is the same as one from a single-peaked population.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• Given an ordering of the alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
testing whether aggregated preferences are consistent with a mixture model of single-peaked
preferences. These conditions can be tested in polynomial time.
• We provide an algorithm which given the aggregated preferences, provides an ordering of
the alternatives for which the mixture model is satisfied, if such an ordering exists.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we further define single-peaked
preferences and the mixture model. Section 3 contains our main result, necessary and sufficient
conditions for a mixture model of single-peaked preferences to hold. Next, section 4 provides
further results, specifically two algorithms to identify the underlying ordering of the alternatives.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Consider a set A, consisting of n alternatives, and a dataset P = {pij ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈ A}. The values
pij represent the probability that i is chosen over j. As we assume strict preferences, pij+pji = 1.
There also exists an ordering of alternatives in A along an axis. This ordering is complete and
transitive and is denoted by. Preference orderings over the alternatives are represented by the
relation . These relations are also complete and transitive. We will use the index m to denote
a particular preference ordering.
Definition 1. A preference ordering m is single-peaked with respect to a given ordering of the
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alternatives  if and only if for every triple i, j, k ∈ A we have:
if i j  k and i m j then i m k (1)
if i j  k and k m j then k m i (2)
The set of all preference orderings that are single-peaked in regards to an ordering  is O.
We further consider the subsets Oij , for which m ∈ Oij if m ∈ O and i m j. A mixture
model of preference assumes that when a decision maker is faced with a choice, each preference
ordering has a certain probability of being used to make the choice. When these probabilities
are consistent with the numbers pij , we say that the model rationalizes the observed data.
Definition 2. A dataset P can be rationalized by a mixture model of single-peaked linear ordering
preferences with respect to a given ordering of alternatives  if and only if there exist numbers
xm ≥ 0,∀m ∈ O for which
∑
m∈Oij
xm = pij , ∀i, j ∈ A (3)
3 Consistency conditions
We claim that the existence of a solution to the system of equalities (3) can be checked easily by
verifying a condition on the pij values. We will prove both the sufficiency and necessity of this
condition, and then finish this section by showing that the condition may be tested in polynomial
time.
Theorem 1. A dataset P can be rationalized by a mixture model of single-peaked preferences
with respect to a given ordering  if and only if for every triple i, j, k ∈ A we have:
if i j  k then pij ≤ pik and pkj ≤ pki (4)
It is easy to see that Condition (4) is a reformulation of Conditions (1-2) for the setting with
aggregated preferences. While we will formally argue the necessity later on, it is clear that if
condition (4) is violated, at least part of the population has to hold preferences that violate
either condition (1) or (2). However, the sufficiency of this condition is not so straightforward.
Indeed, if we look at mixture models with general preferences, we find that the list of necessary
and sufficient conditions is exponential in the number of alternatives1. This is the case, even
though general preference orderings are constrained only by transitivity, which can also be de-
fined by a condition over all triples. To prove the sufficiency of condition (4) we will proceed
as follows. First, we will describe an algorithm whose goal it is to find single-peaked preference
orders m ∈ O and associated values xm satisfying (3). We will show this algorithm is able to
do so if the dataset P satisfies condition (4).
The complete pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1, here we will give a short overview. The
main idea is that if we know the aggregated preferences of (a part of) a population, we wish to
identify a single-peaked preference order held by a part of that population, explaining a portion
1Suck shows that testing the mixture model for strict linear preferences is equivalent to testing membership
of the linear ordering polytope [10]. A full facet description of this polytope thus gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for the mixture model of strict linear preferences. However, since separation over this polytope is
NP-Hard, the facet description is exponential in the number of alternatives. Full descriptions are only known for
small number of alternatives [6, 8]
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of the observed preferences. This usually leaves some part of the data unexplained, captured in
the algorithm by the variables p˜ij . For this unexplained data, another single-peaked preference
is then found, and so on. This process is the key part of the algorithm and is found in the loop
(4-10). For this loop we will prove four properties, which all depend on the condition (4) being
satisfied for p˜ij . First, that the loop always run to completion, i.e. it outputs a strict linear order
m. Second, that m is single-single peaked with regards to . Third, that this m can be
given a weight xm, and for all i, j ∈ A for which i m j, we have xm ≤ p˜ij and that there exist
some i, j ∈ A for which i m j and xm = p˜ij . Finally, at the end of each loop, the values of p˜ij
satisfy condition (4). Given these four properties, we will be able to prove that the algorithm
provides single-peaked linear orders m ∈ O and values xm that satisfy (3).
Algorithm 1 Finding Single-Peaked Preferences
1: INPUT: pij for all i, j ∈ A and .
2: Set p˜ij := pij for all distinct i, j ∈ A, m := 1 and create m:= ∅, M := ∅ and I := ∅.
3: while p˜ij + p˜ji > 0 for all distinct i, j ∈ A do
4: for |M | < |A| do
5: Set I := {i ∈ A\M : p˜ij 6= 0,∀j ∈ A\M, j 6= i}
6: If I = ∅, STOP.
7: Set i∗ := i with i ∈ I for which ∀j ∈ I, j 6= i : i j.
8: ∀j ∈M , set j m i∗
9: Set M := M ∪ {i∗}
10: end for
11: Set xm := mini,j∈A:imj p˜ij .
12: Set p˜ij := p˜ij − xm,∀i, j ∈ A for which i m j.
13: Set m := m + 1
14: Set M := ∅
15: end while
16: OUTPUT: For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} a value xi and order i.
Claim 1. If the values p˜ij meet condition (4), the loop (4-10) will return a linear order.
Proof. If for some M there does not exist an i ∈ A\M such that p˜ij > 0,∀j ∈ A\M , the
algorithm will halt in line 6 without constructing an order. We argue by contradiction : suppose
this is the case and the condition (4) is satisfied. Now consider i ∈ A\M with i  j for all
j ∈ A\M . There is some j for which i j and p˜ij = 0. Now let i′ be the immediate neighbour
of i 2. Then by condition (4), we have p˜ii′ = 0. As p˜ii′ + p˜i′i > 0 and thus, p˜i′i > 0, (4) further
implies p˜i′l > 0,∀l ∈ A\M for some l  i′. Furthermore, for i′, there also exists some j ∈ A\M
for which p˜i′j = 0, this j must have i
′  j. By the same argument as for i, we can see that
p˜i′i′′ = 0 and so on until we reach the alternative n, for which j  n, ∀j ∈ A\M . This alternative
n has pnj > 0,∀j ∈ A\M , a contradiction. Given that condition 4 holds, there must exist an
alternative which can be added to M in each step of the for loop, and the algorithm finds a strict
linear order.
Claim 2. If the values p˜ij meet condition (4), the linear order returned by the loop (4-10) is
single-peaked with respect to .
2Meaning that there is no k ∈ A\M such that i k  i′
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Proof. First, we note that the set I has the following property. For each pair of alternatives
i, j ∈ I, there does not exists a k /∈ I and k ∈ A\M , for which i k  j. This can be argued by
contradiction, suppose such a k exists, then there also exists an alternative l ∈ A\M for which
p˜kl = 0. Without loss of generality we assume l  k. By conditions (4), p˜lj ≥ p˜lk and thus also
p˜jl = 0 in which case j /∈ I.
Furthermore, consider an alternative j. In a given iteration of the loop, we have j ∈ A\M ,
j /∈ I, and j  i for all i ∈ I. Only if there does not exist an alternative j′ ∈ A\M , j′ /∈ I, and
j  j′  i, is j ∈ I possible in the next iteration. Again we argue by contradiction, if j /∈ I
in one iteration and j ∈ I in the next, an alternative i ∈ I with p˜ji = 0 was added to M . If j′
exists, condition (4) implies 0 = p˜ji > p˜jj′ and j can not be added to I. The same argument
applies for i j
From these two observations the claim easily follows. Suppose i ∈ A is the first alternative
set for order m. For every pair of alternatives j, k ∈ A, for which j  k  i, k is added to the
order m before j, as the iteration in which j ∈ I must be after the iteration in which k ∈ I and
k will be added to the order immediately when k ∈ I. For every pair of alternatives h, l ∈ A, for
which i  h  l, h is added to the order before l as l ∈ I implies h ∈ I and if both l, h ∈ I, l
can not be chosen as h l by construction in line 7
Claim 3. In line 11, xm is set such that xm ≤ p˜ij for all i, j ∈ A for which m ∈ Oij and there
exists some i, j ∈ A for which m ∈ Oij , such that xm = p˜ij and xm > 0.
Proof. This is true by construction, an alternative i is only added to M if ∀j ∈ A\M, p˜ij > 0.
As i m j is only the case if j was added to M after i, then all p˜ij over which the minimization
are done are strictly positive. By nature of the minimization, there is also at least one p˜ij to
which xm is equal and xm is no larger than any of the p˜ij .
Claim 4. If condition (4) is satisfied at the beginning of the loop (3-15), the p˜ij values will
satisfy condition (4) at the end of the loop.
Proof. In this proof, we will denote the value p˜ij + p˜ji by y. Throughout, we will assume that
condition (4) is satisfied in line 3. First, let us consider the situation i  j  k, as (4) holds,
p˜ij ≤ p˜ik. Only if an order m exists such that j m i m k is found, will p˜ik, but not p˜ij ,
decrease in line 11. If both i, j ∈ I, i will be added to m first due to line 7. Thus, j m i implies
that there exists l ∈ A, such that p˜il = 0 and p˜jl > 0. We will consider three distinct situations.
First, l  i, then j  l and finally i l  j. Let us consider l  i. As p˜il = 0, p˜li = y, which
implies p˜lj = y and p˜jl = 0 as l  i  j demands p˜li ≤ p˜lj . Therefore, l would prevent both i
and j from being added to I and m. As soon as l was added to M , both i ∈ I and j ∈ I are
possible, and again i would be added to m before j. l  i thus can not lead to j m i. In the
case of j  l, it is clear that because p˜il = 0, we must also have p˜ij = 0, therefore p˜ij ≤ p˜ik can
not be violated. Finally, if i l  j, we must have j m l, if this were not the case i could be
added to m after l but before j. By the earlier arguments in this paragraph j m l while l  j
is only possible if there is some other alternative l′ ∈ A, with l  l′ and p˜ll′ = 0. j  l′ gives
p˜lj = 0 and therefore p˜ij = 0. If on the other hand l l′  j, we can repeat the same argument
until we find some l′′ with i l′′  j and p˜jl′′ = y, implying p˜ji = y and p˜ij = 0. In conclusion,
if i  j  k, we can only have j m i m k if p˜ij = 0. If this is the case, then p˜ij ≤ p˜ik is
satisfied, as p˜ik ≥ 0.
The second situation is k  j  i, in which case we also have p˜ij ≤ p˜ik. Here, only an order
with j m i m k can lead to the condition being violated in line 15. In the previous paragraph,
we established that if a b and the algorithm places b m a, we have p˜ab = 0. Here, k  i and
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i m k, so p˜ki = 0. As p˜ki = 0, it must be the case that p˜ik = y and thus p˜ij ≤ y = p˜ik = y.
We are now in a position to prove theorem 1.
Proof. First, we prove sufficiency of the condition. We have shown, by combining claims 1 and
2, that given a set of values p˜ij which satisfy condition (4), we can find a strict single-peaked
linear order. By claim 3 we have also seen that we can attach a weight to this order which is
non-negative. Even stronger, we have shown that this weight is equal or less than the value p˜ij
for some i, j ∈ N , for which xm ∈ Oij . As the final step of the loop will decrease these p˜ij
values, at least one of these values is set to zero in each run. After at most O(n2) iterations of
the loop, each value p˜ij will then be zero. It can be easily checked that at this point, the values
xm form a solution to (3). As this proof requires the loop to be run multiple times, and the loop
requires condition (4) to hold, claim 4 is crucial, as it shows that if the input of the loop satisfies
the condition, the output will as well.
Next, we turn to the necessity of condition (4). This can easily be verified by a three alter-
native example. Suppose i, j, k ∈ A, with i  j  k and pij > pik. By definition of single-
peaked linear orders, each order for which i  j also has i  k. This means Oij ⊂ Oik and∑
m∈Oij xm ≤
∑
m∈Oik xm. A solution to (3) requires pij =
∑
m∈Oij xm and pik =
∑
m∈Oik xm,
but this is obviously impossible. The same argument can be used for pkj ≤ pki. This shows
necessity of the condition.
Theorem 2. For a given dataset P and ordering , Condition (4) may be checked in time
O(n2).
Proof. It can be easily seen that this condition may be checked in polynomial time. As written,
two inequalities must be checked for each triplet of alternatives, giving an obvious O(n3) time
test. This can be improved upon by noting that when using a matrix of pij values, with rows and
columns ranked according to the ordering , values above the diagonal must be non-decreasing
in the rows and the columns. Conversely, as pij + pji = 1, values below the diagonal are non-
increasing in both rows and diagonals3. As such, each pij value must be compared with only two
other values, providing an O(n2) test.
4 Identifying the single-peaked ordering
In the previous section, we have given necessary and sufficient conditions for the data to be
consistent with a mixture model of single-peaked preferences with respect to an order . In
this section, we will show that if such an order is not given a priori, but there do exist orderings
for which the dataset P satisfies the mixture model, we can identify these. We define the set
of orders LP , with ∈ LP if and only if P satisfies condition (4) with respect to . In this
section, we will prove that we can identify LP . Note that if an order ∈ LP , the reverse order
∈ LP . This can be easily checked because the condition (4) depends on the relative ordering of
alternatives, but not its orientation. i j  k and i j  k lead to the same constraints on P .
Initially, we make the assumption that there is no subset A′ ⊂ A with |A′| > 1, for which the
following holds: ∀i, j ∈ A′, k ∈ A\A′, pik = pjk. In words, this means that there is no subset of
A with two or more items for which all items seem identical when compared to items outside of
3In fact, the lower triangle of the matrix is double graded
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this subset. We will call these Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets (NIA Subsets) and show how
to recognize and handle such subsets in subsection 4.1.
We start with the special case without any NIA subsets and proceed as follows. First, we
derive a number of necessary conditions for all∈ LP . If satisfied, the second and third of these
conditions, given in Claim 6 and 7, can be used to identify an extreme alternative, a¯, which is
either the first or last element of any ordering ∈ LP . This extreme alternative is then used as
input for Algorithm 2 and we will show that, if LP 6= ∅, this algorithm has an ordering ∈ LP
as output. We begin by deriving another necessary condition on the pij values, which we will
use in further proofs.
Claim 5. For any ∈ LP and each triple of alternatives i, j, k ∈ A:
if i j  k then pij ≤ pjk (5)
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and pjk < pij . Due to condition (4), we further have
pjk < pij ≤ pik and pkj ≤ pki. Equivalently, 1 − pjk ≤ 1 − pik or pjk ≥ pik, which violates
condition (4).
The next claim gives a further necessary condition for LP to be non-empty. Specifically, LP
can only be non-empty if all alternatives are indistinguishable from each other, or if there exists
an extreme alternative a¯ which is a Condorcet-loser.
Claim 6. Suppose there exists an ordering ∈ LP . Then either
pij = 0.5,∀i, j ∈ A (6)
Or
∃a¯ : {pa¯i ≤ 0.5,∀i ∈ A and ∃j ∈ A : pa¯j < 0.5} (7)
Proof. First, suppose there is no extreme alternative a¯ for which for all i ∈ A pa¯i ≤ 0.5. Without
loss of generality, we say pa1i > 0.5. Then, because a1  i  an and condition (4), we have
pa1an > 0.5, thus pana1 < 0.5 and again by condition (4), we have for all j ∈ A, panj < 0.5.
Thus, there is certainly at least one extreme alternative for which for all i ∈ A, pa¯i ≤ 0.5.
Now suppose an extreme alternative a¯ exists for which for all i ∈ A, pa¯i ≤ 0.5, but there
exists no extreme alternative for which there exists an i ∈ A for which pa¯i < 0.5. Without loss
of generality we assume that this is the case for a1 , thus for all i ∈ A, pa1i = 0.5. This includes
pa1an = 0.5, so by condition (4), we also have pani ≤ 0.5 for all i ∈ A. As we assume there is no
extreme alternative for which there exists an i ∈ A for which pa¯i < 0.5, we also have pani = 0.5
for all i ∈ A. Now consider i, j ∈ A, with a1  i  j  an. Then condition (5) and pa1i = 0.5
imply pij ≥ 0.5 and the same condition and panj = 0.5 imply pji ≥ 0.5. As a result, for each
pair i, j ∈ A, we have pij = 0.5.
Condition (7) shows a way to identify an extreme alternative a¯ for any ordering ∈ LP .
However, it remains to be shown that no non-extreme alternatives share this characteristic,
which we do in the next Claim.
Claim 7. For any ordering ∈ LP , there is no non-extreme alternative a for which for all
i ∈ A, pai ≤ 0.5 holds and there exists j ∈ A for which paj < 0.5.
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Proof. Suppose such an alternative exists. Without loss of generality, suppose a1 is an extreme
alternative satisfying the condition in Claim 6 and a1  a an. Then pa1a = 0.5 and pana ≥ 0.5.
By condition 5, we then have for all i ∈ A for which a1  a  i, pai ≥ pa1a = 0.5 and for all
j ∈ A for which j  a an, pai ≥ pana ≥ 0.5. Thus, such an alternative cannot exist.
We are now in a position to describe our algorithm for identifying the orders ∈ LP . As
an initial step, we will check the conditions described in Claim 6. If neither (6) or (7), LP = ∅.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that if condition (6), P satisfies the mixture model with respect to
any ordering . In other words, LP is the set of all linear orders over the alternatives. Finally,
if an alternative a matching condition (7) is found, Claims 6 and 7 prove it is an extreme alter-
native a¯ for any ∈ LP . With a¯ as input, Algorithm 2 can now be used to identify a complete
ordering ∈ LP , provided such an ordering exists.
The main idea of Algorithm 2 is as follows. Given an extreme alternative a¯ and two alter-
natives i, j ∈ A for which pa¯i 6= pa¯j , the relative ordering of i and j is determined, such that
Condition (4) is satisfied for the triple a¯, i, j. When this is done for every pair of alternatives, this
results in a (partial) order of the alternatives. For any pair of alternatives, for which pa¯i = pa¯j ,
a third alternatives k ∈ A is sought, which in the partial order has k  i, j or k  i, j and for
which pki 6= pkj . In this way, the partial order is refined until a full ordering of the alternatives
is found.
Algorithm 2 Ordering Algorithm
1: Input: Dataset P , set A, extreme alternative a1
2: Create ordering 
3: For every i ∈ A\{a1}, set a1  i
4: For each pair i, j ∈ A, for which pa1j > pa1i, set i j.
5: Divide all i ∈ A into sets A1, A2, . . ., such that for all i, j ∈ Ak neither i j or i j
6: repeat
7: Find a set Ak with
∣∣Ak∣∣ > 1, for which there exist i ∈ A\Ak and j, j′ ∈ Ak such that
pij > pij′
8: if i j then
9: For each pair j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij > pij′ , set j′  j
10: else
11: For each pair j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij > pij′ , set j  j′
12: end if
13: if There exists a pair j, j′ ∈ Ak, j  j′ and i ∈ A\Ak, for which Condition (4) is violated
then
14: Algorithm terminates without OUTPUT.
15: end if
16: Divide all i ∈ A into sets A1, A2, . . ., such that for all i, j ∈ Ak neither i j or i j
17: until For all i = 1, . . . , n,
∣∣Ai∣∣ = 1
18: OUTPUT: An ordering of the alternatives .
Claim 8. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets, Algorithm 2 terminates.
Proof. First, note that if there exists a set Ak with
∣∣Ak∣∣ > 1, for which there exist i ∈ A\Ak
and j, j′ ∈ Ak such that pij > pij′ , a (partial) ordering is made of the alternatives in this set
and Ak is thus further split up in line (16). As a result, if such a set is always found at the start
of the loop (6-17), the stopping condition for this loop (line 17) is reached in a finite number of
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iterations. Now suppose Algorithm 2 does not terminate, then there is a set Ak with
∣∣Ak∣∣ > 1,
and there exists no i ∈ A\Ak, such that there exist j, j′ ∈ Ak for which pij 6= pij′ . By definition,
this set is a nearly-identical alternative subset.
Claim 9. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets, an ordering ∈ LP exists and
the alternative a1 is an extreme alternative of this ordering, then Algorithm 2 terminates with
output  and ∈ LP .
Proof. Given that an ordering ∈ LP exists and a1 is an extreme alternative, it must be the
case that a1  i for all i ∈ A. Furthermore, it can be easily checked than whenever the
relative ordering of two alternatives i, j ∈ A is fixed in relation to a third alternative k ∈ A (say
k  i  j), whether in line (4) or the loop (6-17), the opposite relative ordering k  j  i
would violate Condition (4).
Claim 10. If there are no Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets and there exists an ordering
∈ LP |LP | = 2
Proof. This follows immediately from the previous result. If no NIA Subsets exist, Algorithm 2
terminates with output  inLP , and whenever a relative ordering of two alternatives is fixed,
the opposite ordering would violate Condition (4). However, if ∈ LP , it can be easily checked
that the reverse order ∈ LP , thus LP = {,}.
4.1 Nearly-Identical Alternative Subsets
We have now shown how to identify the ordering , for which the data satisfy a mixture model
of single-peaked preferences, under the assumption that there are no NIA subsets. In this sub-
section, we will show how to handle such subsets.
As a starting point, we will again look at Algorithm 2. If NIA subsets are present, at some
point it will be impossible to find a subset
∣∣Ak∣∣ > 1 in line (7) to split up in the loop (6-17).
Without loss of generality, let us assume there is a single subset |A′| > 1, then there is a par-
tial ordering of the alternatives a1  . . .  a−  A′  a+  . . .  an. It can be easily
proven, by a similar argument as for Claim 9, that for any triple i, j, k ∈ A\A′ and any triple
i, j ∈ A\A′, k ∈ A′, Condition (4) is satisfied. What remains to be shown is that we can extend
, such that Condition (4)is satisfied for any triple i ∈ A\A′, j, k ∈ A′ and any triple i, j, k ∈ A′.
Consider all pairs i, j ∈ A′, such that maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pij . If pij > pia− and pij > pia+ ,
it is clear that no ∈ LP exists, as both a−  j  i  a+ and a−  i  j  a+ violate
Condition (4). Next, if (without loss of generality) pij > pia− , but pij ≤ pia+ , it must be
the case that a−  i  j. Furthermore, there is no k ∈ A′, maxr,s∈A′ (prs) 6= pik such that
a−  i j  k, as this would also violate Condition (4). As a result, for all j ∈ A′, for which
there exists i ∈ A′, maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pij and all k ∈ A′ for which there does not exist i ∈ A′,
maxr,s∈A′ (prs) = pik, it must be the case that k  j. At this point, the subset A′ is split into
two subsets, and Algorithm 2 can be resumed. Finally, if both pij ≤ pia− and pij ≤ pia+ , there
can be no violation of Condition (4) for any triple r ∈ A\A′, s, t ∈ A′. Now, the question is
whether there exists an ordering′∈ LP ′ . This question can again be answered using Algorithm
(4). If such an order is found, then both ′ and it’s reverse ′ can be used to complete the
partial order , in other words, the ordering a1  . . .  a′1 ′ . . . ′ a′n  . . .  an and
a1  . . .  a′n ′ . . . ′ a′1  . . .  an are in LP . In this case, we will call the NIA subset a
re-orientable subset. Denote the total number of re-orientable subsets by R, then we finish with
the following result.
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Claim 11. If LP 6= ∅, then |LP | = 2R+1.
Proof. We have shown that for every re-orientable subset and a given partial order over alterna-
tives outside of this subset, there are two ways to complete that partial order that satisfy Con-
dition (4). Thus, every re-orientable subset doubles the number of complete orders ∈ LP .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a mixture model from the choice behaviour literature and apply it to a
well-known choice domain from the social choice literature. Necessary and sufficient conditions
are derived for the mixture model to hold for single-peaked preferences and a given ordering of
the alternatives. Furthermore, we show that these conditions are easy to check in polynomial
time, in contrast to the mixture model for general preferences. Furthermore, a polynomial time
algorithm is provided to identify whether or not there exists some ordering of the alternatives
for which the mixture model is satisfied.
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